Three gigawatt-hours of annual cell capacity. Up to $100 million of federal backing. A construction budget above $300 million.
That is the scale of the bet Forge Nano broke ground on in Morrisville, North Carolina, on August 19. The company calls the site America's Battery Gigafactory. At 3 GWh a year, the plant would cover a small fraction of the global buildout. What stands out is the structure around it: a tier-1 cell manufacturer acting as both investor and customer, and a federal procurement rule timed to the plant's opening.
Samsung SDI, one of the world's largest battery manufacturers, is both a $20 million investor and a committed customer, with a conditional procurement agreement to buy cells made at the plant from 2028.
The plant is timed to new National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) battery sourcing rules that take effect in 2028, making federal procurement policy the structural demand driver.
Forge Nano did not start as a battery company. Its core business is atomic layer deposition (ALD), a process for laying down atom-thin coatings, sold to chip fabs and to battery materials makers. The gigafactory is its attempt to move from coating other companies' cells to building its own.
Total investment runs between $300 million and $330 million. The DOE grant is non-dilutive, so no equity changes hands for the money. Production is targeted for 2028.
The tool vendor that started building its own cells
The technology claim is simple to state and hard to copy. Its Atomic Armor coating stabilizes the surface of high-nickel cathode particles. That chemistry gives lithium-ion cells high energy density but also makes them lose capacity with every charge cycle. Coat the particle in a dense, pinhole-free layer and the cell keeps the density while extending cycle life.
That process used to be sold to other cell producers. The semiconductor arm, which applies the same coating technique to chip fabrication, remains the larger business.
The model inverted.
Forge Nano now sells the finished cell rather than the coating that goes into it.
Annual battery cell capacity at Morrisville
Targets 3 GWh of lithium-ion output at full production, about 150 million cells a year, in a facility expanding from 100,000 to nearly 315,000 square feet. · Forge Nano, 2026
Why Samsung SDI is both the investor and the customer
The usual reshoring story pairs federal money with a domestic startup. It adds a third element most U.S. gigafactory projects lack: a tier-1 cell maker with operating expertise and a contractual reason to fill the building.
Samsung SDI invested $20 million in July, split between its Series D financing and a private investment in public equity (PIPE). The capital is tied to the company's planned public listing through Archimedes II, a special purpose acquisition company (SPAC). The investment is the smaller part of the deal. It also provides operational and manufacturing expertise for high-throughput production. It holds a conditional procurement agreement to buy cells made at the plant from 2028, and will have Forge Nano act as its authorized U.S. distributor.
What Samsung SDI gets from a 3 GWh plant it could build itself
A distribution channel for defense, aerospace and industrial buyers that require secure domestic supply.
Option value on Atomic Armor coated cells for future product lines.
The trade is expertise and capital today for supply-chain position in the U.S. market tomorrow.
The federal math: $100 million grant, 2028 deadline
The Department of Energy is providing up to $100 million in non-dilutive funding. New NDAA battery sourcing requirements, which restrict certain battery purchases to domestic producers, begin to apply in 2028, the same year the plant targets first output.
The two are linked. The grant de-risks construction capital; the procurement rule creates the demand. Forge Nano does not need to convince defense buyers that U.S.-made cells are better. It needs to be ready when the rule makes domestic cells the only legal option.
Federal grant behind the gigafactory
Up to $100 million from the Department of Energy, non-dilutive, no equity taken in return for the money. · Forge Nano, 2026
The wave this plant is part of
The Morrisville plant joins a wider buildout. S&P Global expects U.S. grid storage installations of nearly 15 GW in 2026, and post-2022 policy has pulled more than $50 billion into domestic battery manufacturing, according to Canary Media's tracking. Its 3 GWh is small next to that wave.
Its distinctiveness is ownership.
A U.S.-listed materials company holds the cell line, the DOE grant and the distribution channel, while the tier-1 partner contributes expertise and offtake rather than control.
The output mix that makes a 3 GWh plant viable
At full production the facility could supply roughly 10 to 20 million drone batteries, or 34,000 electric military vehicles, or 6 million BB-2590 radio batteries a year. Alternatively, about 275 energy storage system containers, depending on customer demand and product mix.
That flexibility is the point. A defense-first line can switch between drone, vehicle and grid-storage formats as procurement priorities shift, so no single contract carries the plant. The same mix is why the economics work at a scale that would not survive in commodity battery markets.
"For the first time, a U.S. battery technology company will partner with a tier-1 battery manufacturer to produce their cells on American soil."— Paul Lichty, CEO, Forge Nano
What could slip between groundbreaking and first cell
Gigafactory timelines slip as a rule. Equipment delivery, cell qualification and workforce buildout are the classic failure points, and a first-time cell producer has no track record at 3 GWh scale. Starting from a working 100,000-square-foot operation shortens some lead times, but not the qualification step.
Three gigawatt-hours is also small against the market. Global battery cell additions now run in the hundreds of gigawatt-hours per quarter. Its cost curve is unproven against volume manufacturers, and its pricing depends on the defense and aerospace premium; commodity markets would not sustain it.
The SPAC route adds a funding overhang. The Archimedes II merger and the attached PIPE must close cleanly for the company to fund the buildout without further dilution. As we wrote in September, grid batteries set a record in 2025 and then cut their own revenue in wholesale markets. For any new cell capacity, the build is only half the bet. The other half is who pays for the hours it runs.
Will the plant hit full output in 2028?
Probability: 65%. The DOE grant and the tier-1 offtake de-risk capital and demand; residual risk sits in equipment delivery and cell qualification, the two steps no grant can compress.
✅ Arguments for
The Morrisville site already runs a working line, so the expansion builds on proven process knowledge.
NDAA sourcing rules create a guaranteed demand pool from 2028.
Confirmation criteria: manufacturing equipment delivered by early 2027; first Samsung SDI cells qualified in 2027.
❌ Arguments against
3 GWh is a fraction of quarterly global additions, leaving cost competitiveness unproven against volume producers.
SPAC-linked financing raises dilution and scrutiny risk if the merger closes late or below expectations.
Disconfirmation criteria: construction or equipment slip past 2029; the Samsung SDI procurement agreement scaled back; merger capital fails to close.
Samsung SDI's first firm purchase order under the 2028 conditional agreement
NDAA implementing rules: which battery classes are covered and from when
Closing of the Archimedes II merger and the PIPE capital attached to it
First Atomic Armor coated Samsung SDI cells through qualification
Development scenarios
🟢 Optimistic scenario (15%)
Implications: Forge Nano becomes a structural anchor for domestic defense and aerospace cell supply, and investors value the company on expansion rather than construction risk.
🟡 Base-case scenario (70%)
Implications: The facility becomes a proof point for reshoring economics, with returns driven by federal procurement rather than broad commercial share.
🔴 Pessimistic scenario (15%)
Implications: The plant runs below utilization, and the project becomes evidence that reshoring battery cells is harder than policy assumed.