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# Project Omega's $80M Bet That Used Nuclear Fuel Is the Next Supply Chain
- URL: https://nexi.fund/project-omega-nuclear-recycling/
- Published: 2026-11-18T17:30:00.000Z
- Updated: 2026-11-18T17:30:00.000Z
- Description: Project Omega closed an $80M Series A to turn America's used nuclear fuel into HALEU and radioisotope power systems. The HALEU shortcut is the real business case, and the missing licence is the real risk.
- Author: Nexi.fund Labs
- Tags: Energy & Climate, #mode-3, #hook-statistic, #track-A, #layout-asymmetric-long

More than 90,000 tonnes of used nuclear fuel sit in steel-and-concrete casks at reactor sites across the United States. The casks are built to wait. Most of the fuel inside them still holds roughly 90% of the energy it carried when it was first loaded.

That gap — between what the fuel can still do and what the country does with it — is the whole pitch behind Project Omega, a Newport, Rhode Island company that closed an $80 million Series A on November 9, led by B Capital.

The round is small by nuclear standards. The claim underneath it is not. Project Omega says the back end of the fuel cycle is a supply chain the United States never built, and that it can run a refinery turning used fuel into reactor feedstock and radioisotopes from the same flowsheet.

Two products, one process. That is the structural bet.

## The back end is a supply chain nobody priced

The U.S. runs an open fuel cycle. Uranium is mined, enriched, burned once and then stored, according to the Energy Information Administration. No permanent repository has opened. Taxpayers have already paid $12.2 billion in damages for the government's failure to take the waste, and the Department of Energy's inspector general estimates another $38.6 billion to $44.3 billion is still owed.

Stafford Sheehan, Project Omega's founder and chief executive, frames the stockpile as an asset instead of a liability. The company puts the inventory at nearly 100,000 tonnes. B Capital's own write-up uses the more conservative figure of more than 90,000 tonnes.

Here is the editorial read. The waste-reduction number is the pitch. The fuel number is the business.

Cut the volume of nuclear waste by up to 90%, and you get a clean press release. Produce high-assay low-enriched uranium — HALEU — from fuel that has already been enriched once, and you get something advanced reactor developers cannot buy in the volumes they need.

That second claim is the one worth auditing. It is also the one the round is really financing.

## What molten salt actually separates

Project Omega's platform is pyroprocessing. Used fuel is dissolved in a high-temperature molten salt, and electric current pulls its components apart onto electrodes. The company uses a lithium oxide–lithium chloride salt and a proprietary inert anode, according to B Capital, and it leans on electrochemical refining methods that metal producers have run at industrial scale for decades.

The incumbent method — aqueous reprocessing — is what France, Russia and Japan operate. It works. It also generates large secondary wastewater streams and, historically, a separated plutonium stream. That plutonium pathway is why the United States abandoned commercial reprocessing in the 1970s.

Project Omega's process never isolates pure plutonium. One design choice, and it carries most of the political weight. The company also says the process reduces the volume of waste requiring long-term disposal by up to 90%.

Argonne National Laboratory has put a sharper number on the isolation side. Pyroprocessing can shorten the period high-level waste must be isolated from roughly 300,000 years to about 300 years, as EnergyTech reported.

Those are not equivalent claims. Volume reduction changes disposal cost. Isolation-time reduction changes the regulatory category of what is left. Project Omega is selling both, and investors should price them separately.

The materials problem is the part that rarely makes the press release. In pyroprocessing, the anode sits in a corrosive molten salt at high temperature while electric current drives the separation. A reactive anode dissolves into the salt and contaminates the product stream. An inert anode has to survive the bath without doing that.

Project Omega's proprietary inert anode is therefore not a detail. It is the piece of the platform that decides whether the process is continuous or a series of expensive batch experiments. The company has not published anode life, throughput per cell, or salt reprocessing rates. Those are the numbers a pilot exists to produce.

> The country's nuclear renaissance will not happen without the fuel.— Dr. Stafford Sheehan, founder and CEO, Project Omega

The quote is the thesis in one line. The rest of the round is an argument about whether the company can deliver the fuel before the reactors that need it arrive.

## Why America stopped, and why it might start again

The United States invented much of this field, then walked away from it. Commercial reprocessing ended in the 1970s over proliferation concerns, and the policy stayed frozen for half a century. Every attempt to restart it since has died on the same three rocks: cost, thin margins and the absence of a customer willing to sign a long-term contract.

The last serious attempt was the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership in the mid-2000s. It was meant to demonstrate advanced recycling in the United States, with pyroprocessing as its centerpiece. It was defunded before it reached a commercial design.

What changed is not the chemistry. It is the demand curve on both sides of the fuel cycle. Data centers and electrification have turned nuclear from a climate argument into a procurement problem, and reactor developers now need fuel they cannot buy. At the same time, the used-fuel stockpile has become a legal liability with a price tag attached.

That combination is what makes a recycling startup financeable in 2026 and not in 2008\. The technology is older than the market.

It also means the company is exposed to policy reversal. A recycling industry exists in the U.S. because executive orders and DOE awards created a window. Windows close.

## The HALEU shortcut

HALEU is uranium enriched to between 5% and 20% uranium-235\. Today's operating fleet runs below 5%. Most advanced reactor designs — the small modular units, the microreactors, the high-temperature gas designs — need the higher band.

Supply is thin. Idaho National Laboratory projects demand above 50 metric tons a year by 2035 and more than 500 tons a year by 2050\. Centrus, the first U.S. HALEU producer, has made roughly 1.9 metric tons and targets 12 tons of annual capacity by 2029.

That is a rounding error against the forecast, and everybody in the sector knows it. The U.S. also buys most of its enrichment abroad: Russia supplied 26% of enrichment services for U.S. reactors in 2025, and the law banning those imports takes full effect on January 1, 2028.

90,000 t used fuel in U.S. storage \~90% of energy still inside 

#### The domestic feedstock

Company says nearly 100,000 tonnes; B Capital and GAO use 90,000+. · *GAO / B Capital, 2026*

Producing HALEU from used fuel sidesteps the hardest step in the chain. The government holds an inventory of used fuel that began as highly enriched uranium, well above HALEU's 20% ceiling. After irradiation it is still above that ceiling. Enrichment is already done. What remains is chemical separation and down-blending.

That is why the shortcut matters. A conventional HALEU plant needs centrifuges, and centrifuges take years and billions. A separation-and-blend plant needs a hot cell, a salt loop and a licence.

The Department of Energy has already run the proof at Idaho National Laboratory, recovering roughly 10 metric tons of HALEU — about five times what U.S. commercial enrichment has produced to date. Project Omega's ARPA-E program builds directly on that work.

Down-blending is the unglamorous step that makes the economics plausible. Material that starts above 20% U-235 gets diluted with lower-enriched uranium until it lands inside the HALEU band. No centrifuges, no new enrichment capacity, no multiyear queue at a plant that does not exist yet.

The alternative is the conventional route. Centrus is building out HALEU production at its Piketon, Ohio site, and its own targets describe a slow ramp: 12 tons a year by 2029, against a 2035 demand forecast eight times that pace. Even if Centrus hits the plan, the arithmetic does not close.

That gap is the commercial opening. It is also why the company's letter of intent is with a nuclear utility rather than a reactor developer: the utility holds the used fuel and can take the recycled product.

| HALEU metric                  | Figure        | Anchor        |
| ----------------------------- | ------------- | ------------- |
| **U.S. demand, 2035**         | 50+ t / year  | INL, 2021     |
| **U.S. demand, 2050**         | 500+ t / year | INL, 2021     |
| **Centrus, produced to date** | \~1.9 t       | ANS, Jul 2026 |
| **Centrus, 2029 target**      | 12 t / year   | ANS, Jul 2026 |
| **DOE recovery at INL**       | \~10 t        | DOE, 2023     |

Demand and supply figures as published; Centrus output is cumulative, not annual.

## A battery that outlives the mission

The second product line is stranger and, in the near term, easier to sell. Project Omega recovers strontium-90 from the same used fuel and builds radioisotope power systems: solid-state devices that convert radioactive decay directly into electricity.

Radioisotope power is old technology with a supply problem. More than two dozen U.S. space missions have used it since 1961, including the Voyager probes launched in 1977, which are still returning data from interstellar space. The physics works. The constraint has always been isotopes.

Project Omega's devices use alpha- or beta-emitting isotopes instead of more hazardous gamma emitters, according to B Capital, which allows them to operate near people. Radioisotopes already do that every day — most household smoke detectors rely on a small amount of americium-241.

The company demonstrated stable electrical current from strontium-90 at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. It is part of a team with Morgan State University, Northrop Grumman and PNNL that won a roughly $3.37 million DARPA contract under the Rads to Watts program in June 2026, aimed at micro-power systems for extreme environments.

Then there is the X Series: modular expeditionary power units that combine batteries, generators and an intelligent control system. They run on solar and wind today, with isotope power planned later. The defense demand is real; the question is how fast it converts into orders.

Sheehan told Tectonic Defense the company would run its first field tests with PACOM later in November. That is a small milestone with an outsized signal: a defense customer testing a power source in the field is further along than a slide describing one.

The mission set is unusually concrete. Remote sensors, radars, underwater infrastructure, edge-compute nodes and soldier-borne systems all share the same constraint — the battery sets the mission length. A power source measured in years instead of hours changes what those systems can be asked to do.

It also explains why the round closed with investors who fund national security as well as energy. B Capital led, with noa VC and 645 Ventures joining, alongside a list of existing backers that reads like a dual-use portfolio.

## Where the safeguards argument bites

Dr. Allison Macfarlane, an environmental geologist and former chair of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, has raised the standard objection to molten-salt recycling. Mixtures pulled from the salt bath still contain materials attractive for crude weapons or radiological devices, she has argued, and auditing international safeguards across that chemistry is harder than the industry admits.

She has also pushed back on the waste-minimization framing. Recycling does not eliminate the need for a deep geological repository. Heavy transuranic elements remain in the waste stream, generate intense heat and stay radioactive for a very long time.

Both points survive contact with Project Omega's materials. The company says it never separates pure plutonium, which is a genuine improvement on legacy reprocessing. It does not claim the residue can go in a shed.

There is a second-order version of the safeguards question that matters for the business plan. The easiest feedstock is not commercial spent fuel from today's light-water reactors. It is the government's inventory of used fuel that began as highly enriched uranium — the material that makes the HALEU shortcut work.

That inventory is finite, and it is owned by the Department of Energy. Any company building a refinery around it is building on a feedstock whose terms are set by a single counterparty. The commercial stockpile is larger, but recovering HALEU from it is harder.

Nobody has published the split between those two pools in a way that lets an outside reader model the margin. That is not a scandal. It is an early-stage company protecting its position. It is also the difference between a fuel business and a government services contract.

The commercial gaps are more awkward. Project Omega has not disclosed the facility's location, production capacity, construction schedule or expected capital cost. It has not demonstrated the 90% volume reduction at commercial scale. The letter of intent with a large U.S. utility covers used-fuel supply and recycled-fuel offtake; it is not a contract.

For scale, Oklo announced a $1.68 billion recycling center in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, in September 2025\. Project Omega is proposing a comparable category of infrastructure on an $80 million first tranche.

## What $80 million buys, and what it does not

The Series A brings total disclosed funding to $92 million, including a $12 million seed round in February 2026\. The money is earmarked for two things: manufacturing and development of the X Series, and the first stage of the recycling facility.

The valuation was not disclosed. Neither was revenue, headcount or the burn rate implied by a first-of-a-kind facility. For a company that emerged from stealth eight months ago, that is normal. For a reader trying to judge whether $80 million is a bridge or a finish line, it is the missing denominator.

The seed round's stated milestone was narrower and more useful: prove whether the economics of nuclear recycling could work at all. Sheehan has said the team's work over the past year suggests it can, and that the result could be a highly profitable business. That is a founder's claim, made before a commercial facility exists.

That is not enough to build a commercial refinery. It is enough to build a pilot, generate engineering data and keep the licensing clock moving.

The team is built for that specific job. Sheehan is a repeat hardtech founder who previously co-founded Air Company, which converts captured carbon dioxide into jet fuel. Chris Hanson, a former NRC chair, runs licensing and regulatory strategy. The advisory board is chaired by Steve Kuczynski, former chief executive of Southern Nuclear, who oversaw completion of Vogtle Units 3 and 4 — the first newly built U.S. reactors in more than three decades.

Regulatory experience is not a substitute for a licence. It does, however, shorten the distance between a pilot and an application.

The broader policy window is open in a way it has not been since the 1970s. May 2025 executive orders directed the first national policy on used-fuel recycling in decades. In February 2026 the Department of Energy awarded $19 million to advance recycling technologies. The White House has targeted 400 GW of U.S. nuclear capacity by 2050.

We have seen this shape before. As we wrote in November, Voya Energy's $35 million bet on turning scrap aluminum into clean power was another case of a domestic waste stream repriced as fuel. [The mechanics were clever; the scaling question was identical.](https://nexi.fund/voya-energy-metal-fuels/)

The difference here is the customer. Voya needed to displace diesel and gas in distributed generation. Project Omega is aiming at a fuel market where the largest buyer is the U.S. government and the second-largest is a queue of reactor developers who cannot otherwise get HALEU.

## The fuel constraint decides the decade

U.S. electricity demand is projected to grow 21% by 2030 and 39% by 2035, driven above all by data centers, according to EIA and ICF estimates cited by B Capital. Google and Constellation signed a 20-year agreement in October 2026 to bring 890 MW of new nuclear capacity onto the PJM grid. Buyers are contracting for firm clean power years before the reactors exist.

Every one of those reactors needs fuel. That is the constraint the market keeps underweighting. Reactor designs get the headlines and the venture rounds; the fuel cycle gets a paragraph in the appendix.

Project Omega's bet is that the appendix becomes the balance sheet. It is a picks-and-shovels position that does not depend on which reactor design wins, with an uncorrelated second product in isotope power for defense and space.

The risk is timing. A pilot facility, an NRC licence, a utility contract and a commercial HALEU offtake have to land in sequence, and the 2028 enrichment ban is the only hard deadline in the chain.

🎯

**The three numbers that decide this**  
  
HALEU demand above 50 t a year by 2035 against Centrus's 12 t target for 2029.  
  
A 90% waste-volume claim that has not been shown at commercial scale.  
  
An $80 million tranche against a category of facility Oklo has priced at $1.68 billion. 

The company is not asking to be believed on the whole chain at once. It is asking for enough capital to prove the separation step, sign one utility, and let the fuel shortage do the selling.

That is a reasonable ask for a first-of-a-kind plant. It is a dangerous ask if the pilot slips past the point where the first HALEU-hungry reactors are already under construction with no domestic fuel.

The reactors are coming. The fuel is the thing that has to exist first.

[ B Capital: Why We Invested in Project Omega The lead investor's own thesis, with the fuel-cycle numbers, the HALEU demand forecast and the sourcing behind each figure. B Capital ](https://b.capital/why-we-invested/why-we-invested-in-project-omega/?ref=nexi.fund) 

Most detailed public account of the technology and the market case. Read as an investor document, not an independent assessment.

[ Project Omega targets fuel reuse Trade coverage confirming the $80m round, the $92m total and the pilot-facility scope. Nuclear Engineering International ](https://www.neimagazine.com/news/project-omega-targets-fuel-reuse/?ref=nexi.fund) 

Useful for the funding arithmetic and the distinction between pilot isotope recovery and reactor feedstock production.

[ Project Omega raises $80M to advance a closed fuel cycle Independent trade report that adds the Argonne isolation-time figure and the Macfarlane safeguards critique. EnergyTech ](https://www.energytech.com/next-gen-nuclear/news/55417760/nuclear-startup-project-omega-raises-80m-in-series-a-round-to-advance-closed-fuel-cycle-repurposing-used-fuel?ref=nexi.fund) 

The best single source for the counterargument. The repository point is the one the company does not answer.

[ Project Omega raises $80M for fuel recycling facilities Notes what the company has not disclosed: site, capacity, construction schedule, capital cost and valuation. CityBiz ](https://www.citybiz.co/article/931202/project-omega-raises-80-million-series-a-to-build-nuclear-fuel-recycling-facilities/?ref=nexi.fund) 

The disclosure gap in one place. Every missing number is a question a licence application will eventually have to answer.

[ U.S. startup raises $80M to turn used fuel into power and isotopes Nuclear-sector wire coverage tying the round to the recycling facility and the X Series scale-up. NucNet ](https://www.nucnet.org/news/us-startup-raises-usd80-million-to-turn-used-nuclear-fuel-into-power-and-isotopes-11-2-2026?ref=nexi.fund) 

Confirms the round from a specialist desk outside the venture narrative.